Abstract
Prepared foods bring great convenience to people's lives, but they also entail safety risks in all aspects, from production to sales. The cooperation of the supply chain and the supervision of the government are key to promoting the safety management of prepared foods. This paper considers the government's regulation, focuses on the interaction relationship between the producer and the retailer of prepared foods, and builds an evolutionary game model to analyze the influence of collaborative decision-making between prepared food producers and retailers in preventing and controlling food safety risks under the government's regulatory strategy. The research finds that: (1) Under certain conditions, there are three stable equilibrium strategies within the prepared foods supply chain: bilateral low-safety inputs, unilateral high-safety inputs, and bilateral high-safety inputs. (2) Government regulators can influence the safety input behaviors of prepared food supply chain enterprises by adjusting investigation probabilities and punishment severity. (3) The safety input behaviors of these enterprises are influenced by various factors, including costs, revenues, brand image, reputation, and the consequences associated with contractual violations. This paper represents the first systematic analysis of prepared food safety from a supply chain perspective. It fills a gap in the existing literature in this area, offering guidance and suggestions for prepared food supply chain enterprises, as well as references and recommendations for government regulators.