Abstract
In Experiment 1, one group of pigeons learned to classify a set of stimuli into the human language classes cat, flower, car, and chair (categorization); another group learned to classify the same set into arbitrary classes (pseudocategorization). Then, both groups were trained on a new categorization task and their performance compared to that of a control group that had no initial classification training. Hull's (1943) notion of secondary generalization (generalization that is not based on physical similarity but on mediating associations) predicts that categorization experience will facilitate the learning of a new categorization task, whereas pseudocategorization experience will impair it. However, in Experiment 1, performance on the new categorization task was not differently affected by prior experience. In Experiment 2, pigeons initially trained to classify a set of 48 stimuli (original training) were later trained to classify a subset of four of these stimuli using new responses (reassignment training). Then, they were tested on the 44 remaining stimuli. Performance better accorded with original than with reassignment training, indicating that categorization training did not lead to the formation of equivalence classes of stimuli, in which the equivalence relationship is mediated by secondary generalization. The lack of evidence of secondary generalization implies that our pigeons failed to meet Lea's (1984) criterion for conceptual behavior.