Abstract
The world is grappling with emerging, urgent, large-scale problems, such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, and pandemics, which demand immediate and coordinated action. Social processes like conformity and social norms can either help maintain behaviors (e.g. cooperation in groups) or drive rapid societal change (e.g. rapid rooftop solar uptake), even without comprehensive policy measures. While the role of individual heterogeneity in such processes is well studied, there is limited work on the expression of individuals' preferences and the role of anticonformists-individuals who value acting differently from others-especially in dynamic environments. We introduce anticonformists into a game-theoretical collective decision-making framework that includes a complex network of agents with heterogeneous preferences about two alternative options. We study how anticonformists' presence changes the population's ability to express evolving personal preferences. We find that anticonformists facilitate the expression of preferences, even when they diverge from prevailing norms, breaking the "spiral of silence" whereby individuals do not act on their preferences when they believe others disapprove. Centrally placed anticonformists reduce by five-fold the number of anticonformists needed for a population to express its preferences. In dynamic environments where a previously unpopular choice becomes preferred, anticonformists catalyze social tipping and reduce the "cultural lag," even beyond the role of committed minorities-that is, individuals with a commitment to a specific cause. This research highlights the role of dissenting voices in shaping collective behavior, including their potential to catalyze the adoption of new technologies as they become favorable and to enrich democracy by facilitating the expression of views.