Abstract
Humans chose 10 times between two roulette wheels projected on a monitor. During the first trial, the left wheel provided a hypothetical $100 with p = .94, and the right wheel provided $250 with p = .39. A titration procedure adjusted the probability of a $250 win across trials to permit estimation of an indifference point between alternatives. In Experiment 1, intertrial-interval duration (25 vs. 90 s) and whether sessions began with an intertrial interval or a trial were varied in a 2 x 2 design in this risky-choice procedure. Risk aversion (preference for the $100 wheel) increased with intertrial interval but was unaffected by whether sessions began with a trial or an intertrial interval. In Experiment 2, all sessions began with a trial, and subjects were informed that the experiment ended after 10 trials. Intertrial-interval duration had no effect on choice. In Experiment 3, intertrial-interval duration and whether subjects were given $10 or $10,000 before beginning were varied among four groups in a 2 x 2 design. In all other ways, the procedure was unchanged from Experiment 2. Intertrial interval had no effect on choice, but the $10,000 groups showed less risk aversion than the $10 groups. These results can be explained more readily in terms of Kahneman and Tversky's (1984) notion of "framing of the prospect" than in terms of Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel's (1986) behavioral account of risky choice.