Abstract
The main thrust of Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn's ecological approach is that "the use of real-life complex, dynamic, naturalistic stimuli provides a solid basis for understanding brain and behavior" (p. 851). Although we support the overall goal and objectives of Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn's approach to "real-life" neuroscience, their review refers to the terms "ecological validity" and "representative design" in a manner different from that originally introduced by Egon Brunswik. Our aim is to clarify Brunswik's original definitions and briefly explain how these concepts pertain to the larger problem of generalizability, not just for history's sake, but because we believe that a proper understanding of these concepts is important for researchers who want to understand human behavior and the brain in the context of everyday experience, and because Brunswik's original ideas may contribute to Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn's ecological approach. Finally, we argue that the popular and often misused concept of "ecological validity" is ill-formed, lacks specificity, and may even undermine the development of theoretically sound and tractable research.