Abstract
This article will explore the representation of certain mental and somatic phenomena in Beckett's trilogy of novels Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable, exploring how his understanding of schizophrenia and psychosis informs his representation of the relationship between mind and body. It will also examine recent phenomenological and philosophical accounts of schizophrenia (Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, Shaun Gallagher) that see the condition as a disorder of selfhood and concentrate in it on the disruption to ipseity, a fundamental and pre-reflective awareness of self that leads to a loss of 'grip' (in the term of Merleau-Ponty) on concepts and percepts. Beckett's writing might, it is argued, make such disruptions more tangible and intelligible. The article will also consider John Campbell's argument that immunity of the first person to error-Sydney Shoemaker's foundational philosophical idea that we cannot misspeak the first person pronoun-is revoked in states of psychosis, and relate such states to the moments in Beckett's writing where this immunity is challenged, and quasi-psychotic experiences represented.