Abstract
At present, there are two hypotheses about the emergence of SARS-CoV-2; the first is that it was due to a naturally occurring zoonotic jump, and the second contends that it spread due to an accidental dispersion of a laboratory-acquired infection in Wuhan, China. While the pandemic's actual origins remain occluded, it is useful to examine the latter possibility as a paradigm for evaluating biosecurity policy in the post-COVID world. While the pandemic may not have emerged from a research lab, this is possible with research on dangerous pathogens and prompts questions for biosecurity. How might biosecurity protections for such research be modernized while still enabling important, necessary public health research that utilizes dual-use or gain-of-function capabilities? As the world takes urgent action to mitigate shortcomings in the response to COVID-19, such questions and their potential solutions are vital to inform and direct future life science and technology endeavors.