Abstract
Ambidextrous innovation synergy is an effective way for new entrants and R&D entities to break the blockade of key core technologies. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of new entrants, the R&D entity, and monopoly enterprises under the monopoly situation of key core technologies, discusses the dynamic equilibrium process of how new entrants cooperate with the R&D entity to carry out the ambidextrous innovation synergy strategy, and extends the model to the policy subsidy situations of different development stages of key core technology. The results show that the monopoly of key core technologies enhances the original innovation search ability of new entrants and promotes the evolution of enterprise imitation innovation to the exploratory innovation strategy. In the basic research stage of key core technology, the exploratory innovation strategy of new entrants is more sensitive to the cost of network embedding and the original innovation knowledge search. New entrants prefer the imitation innovation strategy, and policy subsidies have no significant effect on exploratory innovation. In the promotion stage of the key core technology market, fiscal and tax subsidies can more easily promote the evolution of new entrants from the imitative innovation strategy to the exploratory innovation strategy than R&D subsidies, and network embeddedness can induce enterprises to carry out exploratory innovation only when a certain threshold is reached. In addition, this paper discusses the influence mechanism of monopoly enterprises' suppression intensities and key core technology breakthrough probabilities on the evolution equilibrium of new entrants' ambidextrous innovation synergy strategies.