Abstract
INTRODUCTION: Tools to screen orders submitted to companies synthesizing nucleic acids or machines that can synthesize them are vital to help ensure the building blocks for pathogens, toxins, or other biotechnology that could cause harm are kept in the right hands. METHODS: The author has argued that it would be worrying if someone discovering a vulnerability in a nucleic acid synthesis tool was to (1) publicly release it without a "patch," (2) set an impossible timeframe to patch it before public release, (3) refuse to report it without a reward, (4) test it on a tool without the developer's/operator's consent, or (5) create a real biological hazard while exploring hypothetical biosecurity vulnerabilities. CONCLUSION: It will be a much harder challenge to develop a parallel set of behaviors desirable in such circumstances. This is a process that should start now. There will soon be a need for a safe, balanced, and reliable reporting infrastructure.