Abstract
Many studies show that people donate more to charitable causes that are presented in concrete (vs. abstract) terms; yet other research suggests that cognitive abstraction (vs. concreteness) encourages prosocial behavior. We propose that abstract cognition facilitates prosocial behavior among people who lowly value loyalty (i.e., those who value impartiality); concrete cognition should facilitate prosocial behaviors among people who highly value loyalty. Across three experiments and one cross-sectional survey in which we operationalize cognitive abstraction (vs. concreteness), valuing loyalty, and prosocial behavior in different ways, we consistently find that abstraction facilitates prosocial behaviors among people who lowly value loyalty. In two of the four studies, we also find that concreteness facilitates prosocial behavior among people who highly value loyalty. These findings help resolve theoretical ambiguity about the cognitive underpinnings of prosociality, and they have important practical implications for optimal framing of charity appeals to potential donors.