Abstract
The world is abuzz with experts who can help us in domains where we understand too little to help ourselves. But sometimes experts in one domain carry their privileged status into domains outside their specialization, where they give advice or otherwise presume to speak authoritatively. Ballantyne (in: Knowing our limits. Oxford University Press, New York, 2019) calls these boundary crossings "epistemic trespassing" and argues that they often violate epistemic norms. In the few cases where traveling in other domains is permissible, Ballantyne suggests there should be regulative checks ("easements") for the experts who are crossing domain boundaries. I argue that boundary crossing is warranted more often than Ballantyne allows. And while Ballantyne argues that boundary crossing is prima facie epistemically problematic, I contend that many cases of boundary crossing are not properly instances of "trespassing," and, therefore, raise no prima facie epistemic concerns. I further argue that identifying cases of what I call "epistemic neighborliness" bolsters Ballantyne's project, making it easier for novices and other experts to identify epistemic trespassing along with its epistemic problems.