Abstract
Traditional cognitive linguistic theories acknowledge that human emotions are embodied, yet they fail to distinguish the dimensions that reflect the direction of neural signaling between the brain and body. Differences exist across languages and cultures in whether embodied emotions are conceptualized as afferent (feelings from the body) or efferent (enacted through the body). This important distinction has been neglected in academic discourse, arguably as a consequence of the 'lexical approach', and the dominance within the affective psychology of the cognitive and semantic models that overlook the role of interoception as an essential component of affective experience. Empirical and theoretical advances in human neuroscience are driving a reappraisal of the relationships between the mind, brain and body, with particular relevance to emotions. Allostatic (predictive) control of the internal bodily states is considered fundamental to the experience of emotions enacted through interoceptive sensory feelings and through the evoked physiological and physical actions mediated through efferent neural pathways. Embodied emotion concepts encompass these categorized outcomes of bidirectional brain-body interactions yet can be differentiated further into afferent or interoceptive and efferent or autonomic processes. Between languages, a comparison of emotion words indicates the dominance of afferent or interoceptive processes in how embodied emotions are conceptualized in Chinese, while efferent or autonomic processes feature more commonly in English. Correspondingly, in linguistic expressions of emotion, Chinese-speaking people are biased toward being more receptive, reflective, and adaptive, whereas native English speakers may tend to be more reactive, proactive, and interactive. Arguably, these distinct conceptual models of emotions may shape the perceived divergent values and 'national character' of Chinese- and English-speaking cultures.