Abstract
BACKGROUND: Moral evaluation is identified as the first stage in the theory of moral judgment, and academics believe that it may align with the social intuitionist model. This study aims to prove that the model's emotional dominance hypothesis applies to moral evaluation by presenting a computational decision-making model that mathematically formalizes this emotional dominance decision-making process. We also compared different types of valence evaluation tasks to test the emotional priority hypothesis. METHODS: We used a convenience sampling method to randomly recruit 30 enrolled college students. The drift-diffusion model was employed to analyze reaction times for words with various emotional and moral valences Additionally, we designed different valence evaluation tasks based on the response relevance hypothesis and evaluated the processing order through reaction time comparisons. RESULTS: The analysis revealed that the emotional mechanism of immoral evaluation differs from moral evaluation. An increase in emotional valence accelerates the speed of evidence accumulation (v) for moral evaluation (M = 1.21, 0.2% < 0 < 99.8%) but lowers decision caution (a) in immoral evaluation (M = -0.64, 96.1% < 0 < 3.9%). In contrast, moral valence does not have a significant influence on evaluation processes (v, M = -0.28, 72.1% < 0 < 27.9%; a, M = -0.32, 79.3% < 0 < 20.7%). Furthermore, We found no significant difference in reaction times between moral and immoral words in the emotional evaluation task (F(1,29) = 0.55, p = 0.464, partial η(2) = 0.02), but a significant difference existed in the moral evaluation task (F(1,29) = 17.99, p < 0.001, partial η(2) = 0.38), indicating that the tendency of relatively fast immoral evaluation in emotional evaluation tasks may be caused by emotional priority. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings support the intuitive model's emotional dominance hypothesis and introduce a new emotional mechanism into moral evaluation. This study clarifies the distinct emotional processes in moral and immoral evaluations, fills a gap in the research on moral evaluation, and offers insights into human decision-making in moral contexts.