Abstract
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory predicts that features of institutional arrangements determine the intensity of their governance instruments. Consequently, institutional features link to transaction costs, but the linkages have received little attention in the public health literature. This study sought to address this gap. It examined the governance features of institutional arrangements and their transaction cost implications for providing HIV prevention and social support services in Uganda. The analysis was based on 4 proposed TCE governance instruments: administrative controls, adaptation, incentives and contract laws. These governance instruments were assessed in 3 modes of delivery( institutional arrangments) for HIV and AIDS Services in Uganda: Contracting-Out - the case of DREAMS (Determined, Resilient, Empowered, AIDS-free, Mentored and Safe); a Public-Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) partnership - the case of the CHAI (Community-led HIV/AIDS Initiative); and direct Public Sector Delivery. These assessed delivery modes follow Williamson's TCE framework of 3 institutional arrangements to deliver goods and services, notably market, hybrid (partnership) and internal (hierarchy) delivery, with related governance features. Within this framework, the discriminating alignment hypothesis guided the analysis. According to the hypothesis, the delivery modes of goods and services result in smaller transaction costs when their governance features are as predicted by TCE. The hypothesis was assessed by analysing, with qualitative methods, the differences in HIV and AIDS services characteristics across the 3 arrangements and their differences with theory prediction, and hence the difference in transaction cost implications. The study found that the delivery arrangements that minimised cost are those whose HIV and AIDS services were aligned with the TCE theory prediction. The aligned 'public-NGO partnership' arrangement (CHAI) had fewer sources of transactional costs than the misaligned arrangements - 'contracting-out' (DREAMS) and 'public sector'. The analysis revealed that the DREAMS and public sector delivery models suffered some flaws in efficiencies. DREAMS had high administrative controls, high-powered tangible incentive intensity and intensive monitoring mechanisms for performance adaptation due to the lack of 'trust' on the part of the financing agency, contrary to the TCE prediction. In contrast with the TCE prediction, low administrative controls in the public sector arose from the failure to invest in performance monitoring systems. The high-powered incentive intensity and low administrative controls observed in the CHAI arrangement primarily stemmed from the reliance on informal institutions (trust, social expectations and reputation) rather than principal-agent arms-length sanctions. These results suggest that the level of transaction costs is associated with features of institutional arrangements. The valuable insights from TCE could contribute to policymaking during the design of institutional arrangements to efficiently deliver HIV and AIDS services.