Abstract
Countries depend on both high- and low-skilled immigration to meet economic needs. But most voters prefer high-skilled immigrants, despite the fact that multiple economic sectors structurally depend on low-skilled immigrants. In this paper, we examine voter preferences toward low-skilled immigrants as one barrier to effective immigration policy, even in political regimes where immigration is the consequence of highly coordinated or "planned" policies. Specifically, we consider whether government communication around the benefits of low-skilled immigration can increase favorability of such policies. We are particularly interested in the ways in which government communicates immigration messages and whether the scope or concentration of the proposed benefits will move individual preferences. In an online survey experiment, we present Canadians (N=2,023) with a policy brief that manipulates immigrant skill level (high vs. low), economic outcomes of migration (positive vs. mixed), and the geographic scope of benefits (concentrated vs. sociotropic). Employing two measures of policy support, we find some evidence that positive framing can increase overall support for low-skill migrants. We also find that manipulating framing around high-skilled workers has little effect on support for low-skill workers, even when that framing presents countervailing evidence as to the benefit of high-skilled labor. In sum, our findings suggest that elite level communication around the benefits of low-skill labor may have the ability to disrupt longstanding antipathy for low-skilled labor, even in regimes with longstanding support for high-skilled labor.