Abstract
Jurors and other legal decision-makers are often required to make judgments about the likely memory accuracy of another person. Legal systems tend to presume that decision-makers are well-placed to make such judgments (at least in the majority of cases) as a result of their own experiences with memory. However, existing research highlights weaknesses in our abilities to assess the memories of others and suggests that these weaknesses are not easily ameliorated through the provision of information. In this work we examine the accuracy of layperson assessments of "real" eyewitness identifications following observation of a mock crime. We examine whether novel instructions, characteristics and beliefs of assessors, and underlying reasoning strategies are associated with improved or impaired judgment accuracy. The results support prior research in demonstrating a tendency towards over-belief in the accuracy of identifications. They suggest that reliance on what witnesses have said rather than attempts to make inferences from their statements (e.g., in relation to the level of detail provided or non-verbal cues in testimony) is associated with greater accuracy in assessments and that some individual differences and beliefs about memory are also associated with greater accuracy. However, there was no evidence that the instructions tested were effective. We discuss the implications of results for procedure surrounding the evaluation of memory in the legal context.