Abstract
The environmental pollution caused by logistics packaging in China has attracted increasing attention in recent years, and circular packaging is considered an effective means to solve the aforementioned problem. Therefore, this study considers the uncertainty of the external environment; constructs a stochastic game model of circular logistics-packaging promotion, which consists of environmental regulators, logistics enterprises, and consumers; collects data related to logistics packaging in China to describe the current circular-packaging promotion dilemma; and conducts a parameter-sensitivity analysis. The results show that (1) after a short period of fluctuation, the environmental regulator will lock in the "strong regulation" strategy, whereas logistics enterprises and consumers will quickly lock in the "no promotion" and "negative use" strategies. (2) The change in the initial probability will affect the rate of strategy evolution of the gaming system. (3) The "strong regulatory" strategy of environmental regulators and the increase in the number of circular-packaging cycles can help establish a logistics-recycling-packaging system. (4) The increase in recycling incentives can cause consumers to shift toward "active use" strategies, but this has accelerated the rate at which logistics companies lock into "no promotion" strategies. (5) The increase in the intensity of random interference will raise the fluctuation of the evolution of the game subject. For logistics enterprises, moderate random interference helps them evolve toward the "promotion" strategy.