Abstract
Deliberative democracy aims at reaching collective decisions through mechanisms that involve flexible opinions, variable alternative sets and information gathering in the process of decision making as opposed to exogenously fixed alternative sets and preference rankings. Deliberative democracy includes elements derived from bargaining and negotiation. Among its virtues, some proponents of deliberative democracy have included the possibility that several important negative results of the theory of voting can be avoided. The basic stratagem is to dismiss the universal domain condition typically assumed in social choice results. Thus, the validity of the results escaped from is obviously not in question. The position taken in this paper is that, while in some respects plausible, the escape argument is based on a too narrow view of the incompatibility results of the social choice theory. Some fundamental paradoxes remain beyond the reach of the deliberative techniques and are even exacerbated by them. That said, the deliberative approach can certainly be adopted for making voting alternatives more meaningful to those involved.