Abstract
Sanctions are among the most widely used foreign policy tools of governments and international organizations in response to national or international wrongdoings. Beyond the dichotomous question of whether to adopt or not to adopt sanctions against a target, decision-makers develop different designs when they impose restrictions: targeted sanctions like asset freezes and travel bans, arms embargoes, or economic sanctions such as financial restrictions and commodity bans. What accounts for this variation in the design of sanctions regimes? This article investigates this question by developing a configurational explanation that combines domestic- and international-level factors for the choice of an economic versus a targeted sanctions design. I test these factors on original data mapping European Union (EU) autonomous sanctions against third countries in force in 2019 through set-theoretic methods. The analysis shows that a militarily strong target's serious misbehavior through grave human rights violations triggers EU action in the form of economic sanctions, however, only in combination with two conditions: first, the EU reacts to a misbehavior through the adoption of an economic design when the United States imposes economic sanctions, too (path 1); second, the salience of a target's conflict triggers an economic design of sanctions in case of grave human rights violations (path 2). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-022-09458-0.