Security of patient data when decommissioning ultrasound systems

超声系统退役时患者数据的安全保障

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Abstract

BACKGROUND: Although ultrasound systems generally archive to Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS), their archiving workflow typically involves storage to an internal hard disk before data are transferred onwards. Deleting records from the local system will delete entries in the database and from the file allocation table or equivalent but, as with a PC, files can be recovered. Great care is taken with disposal of media from a healthcare organisation to prevent data breaches, but ultrasound systems are routinely returned to lease companies, sold on or donated to third parties without such controls. METHODS: In this project, five methods of hard disk erasure were tested on nine ultrasound systems being decommissioned: the system's own delete function; full reinstallation of system software; the manufacturer's own disk wiping service; open source disk wiping software for full and just blank space erasure. Attempts were then made to recover data using open source recovery tools. RESULTS: All methods deleted patient data as viewable from the ultrasound system and from browsing the disk from a PC. However, patient identifiable data (PID) could be recovered following the system's own deletion and the reinstallation methods. No PID could be recovered after using the manufacturer's wiping service or the open source wiping software. CONCLUSION: The typical method of reinstalling an ultrasound system's software may not prevent PID from being recovered. When transferring ownership, care should be taken that an ultrasound system's hard disk has been wiped to a sufficient level, particularly if the scanner is to be returned with approved parts and in a fully working state.

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