Abstract
According to the US National Institute on Aging and the Alzheimer's Association (NIA-AA), Alzheimer's disease (AD) should be understood as a biological construct. It can be diagnosed based on AD-characteristic biomarkers only, even if AD biomarkers can be present many years before a person experiences any symptoms of AD. The NIA-AA's conceptualisation of AD radically challenges past AD conceptualisations. This article offers an analytic framework for the clarification and analysis of meanings and effects of conceptualisations of diseases such as that of AD. This framework consists of nine questions that allows us to determine how the conceptualisations of diseases, such as that of AD, link or decouple the following terms to/from each other: screening, diagnosis, pathology, disease (along the lines of what have been labelled as "biological-physiological" or "normative" conceptions of disease in philosophy of medicine), symptoms, and illness. It also includes questions regarding how specific decouplings open up for new categories through which people can understand themselves in new ways, and what spaces of possibilities specific conceptualisations (and their decouplings and linkages) open to. The article shows how specific decouplings/linkages can open up not only for the phenomena of pathologisation but also for a distinct, but related phenomenon here termed as diseasisation.