Resilient oscillator-based cyberattack detection for distributed secondary control of inverter-interfaced Islanded microgrids

基于弹性振荡器的孤岛微电网分布式二次控制弹性网络攻击检测

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Abstract

With the increasing integration of Distributed Generation (DG) units and advanced control systems, microgrids have become more vulnerable to cyberattacks, particularly those targeting secondary control mechanisms. False Data Injection (FDI) and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can significantly disrupt the stability and performance of microgrids by manipulating communication links and control signals. This paper proposes a robust cyber-resilient strategy to mitigate the impact of cyberattacks on secondary control in islanded AC microgrids. The proposed approach enhances the resilience of frequency regulation and real power sharing by integrating adaptive anomaly detection and hierarchical control mechanisms. The approach's effectiveness is evaluated through comprehensive simulations in MATLAB/Simulink, considering various cyberattack scenarios, including FDI and DoS attacks on critical communication links. Results demonstrate that, under normal conditions, the primary and secondary controllers ensure frequency stability and balanced power distribution. However, in the presence of cyberattacks, the conventional control strategy fails to maintain stability, leading to frequency deviations and power imbalances. The proposed approach successfully detects and mitigates these attacks, restoring system stability and ensuring robust operation. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated across different microgrid topologies, including networked, looped-type, and bus-type configurations, demonstrating its adaptability and effectiveness in diverse network structures.

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