Abstract
Provable data possession (PDP) is a technique that enables the verification of data integrity in cloud storage without the need to download the data. PDP schemes are generally categorized into public and private verification. Public verification allows third parties to assess the integrity of outsourced data, offering good openness and flexibility, but it may lead to privacy leakage and security risks. In contrast, private verification restricts the auditing capability to the data owner, providing better privacy protection but often resulting in higher verification costs and operational complexity due to limited local resources. Moreover, most existing PDP schemes are based on classical number-theoretic assumptions, making them vulnerable to quantum attacks. To address these challenges, this paper proposes an identity-based PDP with a designated verifier over lattices, utilizing a specially leveled identity-based fully homomorphic signature (IB-FHS) scheme. We provide a formal security proof of the proposed scheme under the small-integer solution (SIS) and learning with errors (LWE) within the random oracle model. Theoretical analysis confirms that the scheme achieves security guarantees while maintaining practical feasibility. Furthermore, simulation-based experiments show that for a 1 MB file and lattice dimension of n = 128, the computation times for core algorithms such as TagGen, GenProof, and CheckProof are approximately 20.76 s, 13.75 s, and 3.33 s, respectively. Compared to existing lattice-based PDP schemes, the proposed scheme introduces additional overhead due to the designated verifier mechanism; however, it achieves a well-balanced optimization among functionality, security, and efficiency.