Abstract
Cockroach control in Beijing's residential households is supported by the local government previously but now it is paid by the residents themselves. Under the new residential household cockroach control strategy, the evolutionary game theory is applied in this study to construct an evolutionary game model for the choice behaviour of both PCO (Pest Control Operation) enterprises and the local governments under government regulation. The evolutionary stabilization strategies under different situations were suggested and the key factors for the evolutionary game behaviour were analyzed through Matlab simulation. It was found that the benefits and costs of the local governments' promotion for the cockroach eradication activities, the incremental benefits of PCO enterprises through government publicity and the subsidies for the activities, and the additional costs of PCO enterprises to participate in cockroach eradication activities are the key factors. The incremental benefits from the publicity of the activities and the government subsidies can be used to incent the PCO enterprises' activities, which may be failure without the government promotion. This study confirms the decisive role of the strategic choices of PCO enterprises and the government for effective cockroach eradication activities. Therefore, before the campaign is launched, it is necessary to take into account the economic benefits of PCO enterprises and the public interests of the governments so that the game system can evolve out of the "ineffective" and undesirable "locked" state and evolve towards the ideal state, while would be a basis for other anti- pest efforts.