Abstract
People will make different moral judgments in similar moral dilemmas where one can act to sacrifice some number of lives to save several more. Research has shown that although people can reason that an action would save more lives, automatic processes can overwrite deliberate reasoning. Having participants imagine hypothetical moral dilemmas, researchers have discovered that factors such as action/omission, means/side-effect, and personal/impersonal can affect judgment. Joshua Greene suggests that these features do not affect people's judgment because they are morally relevant but are instead a result of the myopic nature of the automatic moral process. Greene hypothesizes that there is some myopic module or domain-general process that attaches a negative emotional response to an action when one is contemplating violent actions. In the present research a model of this myopic automatic process is paired with an analytic system to replicate deontological and utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Our system, MERDJ, models this in simulated spiking neurons. The system takes in representations of specific moral dilemmas as inputs and outputs judgments of appropriate or inappropriate.