Abstract
Market access restrictions have been the focus of attention for various market players, but there are fewer studies on the competitive mechanism of market access restrictions on firms' product sales. This paper investigates the competitive mechanism of leader-follower product sales based on market access restrictions and forward contracts. First, the mechanism of leader-follower sales decisions based on market access restrictions and forward contracts is clarified. Second, it models the forward default risk suffered by followers and the profit rate of leader-follower based on market access restrictions and forward considerations by Bayes' posterior probability method. Moreover, it severely explores the impact mechanisms of the degree of market access restrictions on leaders and followers when followers do not adopt and adopt forwards and makes a simulation analysis. The results show that: (i) When followers do not employ forward contracts, the less restrictive degree of market access increases the supply of leaders, and leaders' competition for product sales further leads to a decrease in the provision of followers. (ii) When followers use forwards, leaders' and followers' expected discounted profit rates decrease with the total supply of products in the market increases. (iii) If the degree of market access restrictions is low, the followers suffer an increased forward default risk, resulting in their rate of revenue decrease. The findings of this paper have some practical significance and policy implications for the regulator to adjust the degree of market access restriction in each restricted access area, to establish a reasonable and efficient competitive environment for product sales, as well as for firms to choose the optimal way of competing for product sales.