Abstract
Biodiversity offsetting is an increasingly applied tool aiming to compensate for environmental damage caused by exploitation projects. Critics, however, raise concerns over the purported effectiveness of offsetting and question the ethical underpinnings and implications of offsetting. These ethical dimensions have largely been overlooked in research, which may lead to offsetting systems that fail to respect the values intended to be safeguarded. To address these dimensions, 5 ethical objections in the scientific literature were identified: offsetting violates nature's intrinsic value; losses of nature cannot be compensated for by human interventions; too little is known to make adequate trades; offsetting impedes virtuous dispositions toward nature; and offsetting has negative justice implications. We examined these objections and arguments against them based on the ethical concepts of intrinsic and instrumental values, anthropocentrism, nonanthropocentrism, and deontological, consequentialist, and virtue-ethical paradigms. Both nonanthropocentric and anthropocentric concerns were expressed in deontological, consequential, and virtue-ethical framings. Objections mostly had a deontological or virtue-ethical basis, whereas counterarguments were based on consequential reasoning, but common ground in practice is often conceivable. Based on our findings, we formulated 10 recommendations for policy makers and 5 questions for practitioners to consider. We propose, for example, that policy makers clarify aims, legislate on no-go areas, and govern the use of multipliers. We suggest that practitioners consider, for instance, how to improve case-specific knowledge and promote learning and stakeholder engagement. We hope these recommendations and questions will encourage further discussion of the ethics of biodiversity offsets and ultimately strengthen the respect for biodiversity and human-welfare values at stake in offsetting projects.