Abstract
BACKGROUND: Genotype imputation is an essential step in genetic studies to improve data quality and statistical power. Public imputation servers are widely used by researchers to impute their data using otherwise access-controlled reference panels of high-fidelity genomes held by these servers. RESULTS: We report evidence against the prevailing assumption that providing access to panels only indirectly via imputation servers poses a negligible privacy risk to individuals in the panels. To this end, we present algorithmic strategies for adaptively constructing artificial input samples and interpreting their imputation results that lead to the accurate reconstruction of reference panel haplotypes. We illustrate this possibility on three reference panels of real genomes for a range of imputation tools and output settings. Moreover, we demonstrate that reconstructed haplotypes from the same individual could be linked via their genetic relatives using our Bayesian linking algorithm, which allows a substantial portion of the individual's diploid genome to be reassembled. We also provide population genetic estimates of the proportion of a panel that could be linked when an adversary holds a varying number of genomes from the same population. CONCLUSIONS: Our results show that genomes in imputation server reference panels can be vulnerable to reconstruction, implying that additional safeguards may need to be considered. We suggest possible mitigation measures based on our findings. Our work illustrates the value of adversarial algorithms in uncovering new privacy risks to help inform the genomics community towards secure data sharing practices.