Abstract
This study reevaluates criticism of the Korean government's R&D investment strategy, which was considered an 'R&D cartel' and was cited as a reason for the Korean government's R&D cuts in 2023, through an advanced framework of quantum game theory. By modeling the interaction between the government and researchers as a quantum information strategy game, it redefines the dynamics of R&D investment as a quantum game involving two key players: the R&D manager (Alice) and the research performer (Bob). This quantum game, akin to the Prisoner's Dilemma but focused on responsibility and sincerity, allows for the exploration of strategic complexities and decision-making dynamics not possible in classical models. It introduces quantum entanglement and superposition as innovative strategies to shift the paradigm of R&D investment, suggesting that terms like 'R&D bureaucracy' and 'R&D monopoly' more accurately describe the moral hazards in this sector than 'R&D cartel'. Through simulations, the paper demonstrates how quantum strategies can significantly alter outcomes, providing fresh insights and policy alternatives for R&D innovation. This research not only challenges conventional investment frameworks but also proposes a novel approach for achieving Pareto optimal outcomes in government R&D investments, emphasizing the transformative potential of quantum game theory in strategic decision-making and policy development.