Abstract
As threat vectors and adversarial capabilities evolve, Cloud-Assisted Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CCAVs) are becoming more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Several established threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) methodologies are publicly available to address the evolving threat landscape. However, these methodologies inadequately capture the threat data of CCAVs, resulting in poorly defined threat boundaries or the reduced efficacy of the TARA. This is due to multiple factors, including complex hardware-software interactions, rapid technological advancements, outdated security frameworks, heterogeneous standards and protocols, and human errors in CCAV systems. To address these factors, this study begins by systematically evaluating TARA methods and applying the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privileges (STRIDE) threat model and Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, and Discoverability (DREAD) risk assessment to target system architectures. This study identifies vulnerabilities, quantifies risks, and methodically examines defined data processing components. In addition, this study offers an attack tree to delineate attack vectors and provides a novel defense taxonomy against identified risks. This article demonstrates the efficacy of the TARA in systematically capturing compromised security requirements, threats, limits, and associated risks with greater precision. By doing so, we further discuss the challenges in protecting hardware-software assets against multi-staged attacks due to emerging vulnerabilities. As a result, this research informs advanced threat analyses and risk management strategies for enhanced security engineering of cyberphysical CCAV systems.