Abstract
Two general claims are made in this work. First, we need several different layers of "theory," in particular for understanding human behavior. These layers should concern: the cognitive (mental) representations and mechanisms; the neural underlying processes; the evolutionary history and adaptive functions of our cognition and behaviors; the emergent and complex social structures and dynamics, their relation and feedbacks on individual minds and behaviors, and the relationship between internal regulating goals and the external functions/roles of our conduct; the historical and cultural mechanisms shaping our minds and behaviors; the developmental paths. Second, we do not just need "predictions" and "laws" but also "explanations"; that is, we need to identify the mechanisms producing (here-and-now, or diachronically) a given phenomenon. "Laws" are not enough; they are simply descriptive and predictive; we need the "why" and "how." Correlations are not enough (and they are frequently misleading). We need computational models of the processes postulated in our theories.