Abstract
With the practical implementation of continuous-variable quantum cryptographic protocols, security problems resulting from measurement-device loopholes are being given increasing attention. At present, research on measurement-device independency analysis is limited in quantum key distribution protocols, while there exist different security problems for different protocols. Considering the importance of quantum digital signature in quantum cryptography, in this paper, we attempt to analyze the measurement-device independency of continuous-variable quantum digital signature, especially continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature. Firstly, we calculate the upper bound of the error rate of a protocol. If it is negligible on condition that all measurement devices are untrusted, the protocol is deemed to be measurement-device-independent. Then, we simplify the calculation by using the characteristics of continuous variables and prove the measurement-device independency of the protocol according to the calculation result. In addition, the proposed analysis method can be extended to other quantum cryptographic protocols besides continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature.